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URING the Survey period, the Texas appellate courts handed down
numerous decisions construing various rules of civil evidence. The
cases of greatest significance arose in the following substantive ar-
eas: (1) Article I-General Provisions; (2) Article II-Judicial Notice; (3)
Burden of Proof, Presumptions, and Inferences; (4) Article IV-Relevancy
and Its Limits; (5) Article V-Privileges; (6) Article VI-Witnesses; (7) Ar-
ticle VII-Opinions and Expert Testimony; (8) Article VIII-Hearsay; (9)
Article IX-Authentication and Identification; (10) Article X-Contents of
Writings, Recordings, and Photographs; and (11) Parol Evidence.
I. ARTICLE I-GENERAL PROVISIONS
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(2) provides that error may not be
predicated upon a ruling excluding evidence unless the substance of the evi-
dence was made known to the court by offer.' Rule 103(b) requires the of-
fering party to make the offer of proof as soon as practicable, but before the
reading of the court's charge to the jury.2 During the Survey period, a party
that failed to make an offer of proof or bill of exception did not preserve its
error.3 The Amarillo court of appeals explained that even assuming argu-
endo the party had requested the court to admit the evidence in a timely
manner, and the party did not object to the court's failure to rule prior to the
reading of the charge to the jury. Consequently, the party neither obtained a
timely ruling on the offer nor timely objected to the court's failure to rule.4
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling admitting evidence in the ab-
sence of a timely objection or motion to strike.5 Where a party failed to
object to an expert's testimony on the grounds that the articles on which the
expert relied were published after plaintiff's exposure to an herbicide, and
therefore, could not form the basis of liability for inadequate warnings, the
party waived any error in the admission of this testimony.6
@ Linda L. Addison 1990
* J.D. University of Texas. Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 103(a)(2).
2. Id. 103(b).
3. Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Exploration Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 274-75 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
4. Id at 275.
5. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 103(a)(1).
6. Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (5th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 110
S.Ct. 328, 100 L.Ed. 2d. 318 (1990).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 105 provides that when evidence is admissi-
ble as to one party or for one purpose, the court, upon request, shall restrict
the evidence to its proper scope, and instruct the jury accordingly.7 During
the Survey period, one court held that when evidence offered for two pur-
poses is admissible for one purpose, but not the other, the exclusion of such
evidence is not error where the proponent of the evidence does not limit its
offer for the admissible purpose only.8
II. ARTICLE II-JUDICIAL NOTICE
Article II of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs judicial notice.
During the Survey period, courts affirmed the taking of judicial notice of a
trial court's own record in the same case.9 In Birdo v. Holbrook, an appellate
court also properly took judicial notice of its own records.' 0
In Texas Real Estate Commission v. NagleI the Texas Supreme Court
wrote that although a court may take judicial notice of its own records and
judgments, the use to which records and judgments may be put are circum-
scribed by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 12 A trial
court properly took judicial notice of previous proceedings between the par-
ties in the same county, where the proceedings were closely related to the
case before the court.1 3 One court took judicial notice of the usual and cus-
tomary attorney's fees necessary for prosecution of an appeal.' 4 Where the
unsworn statement of plaintiffs' attorney represented the only evidence sup-
porting an award of attorneys' fees, the supreme court presumed the trial
court to have taken judicial notice of the usual and customary attorneys' fees
and of the contents of the case file in awarding fees in that amount."5
In a usury action, the trial court correctly took judicial notice of interest
rate ceilings issued by the Consumer Credit Commission. 16 Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 20 1(c), a federal district court took judicial notice
that certain portions of the Army field manuals constitute suitable standards
for sanitary measures at proposed gatherings of a large number of people in a
national forest. 17
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 202 provides that a court may judicially
7. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 105.
8. Worldwide Anesthesia Assocs. v. Bryan Anesthesia, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
9. Smith v. Smith, 757 S.W.2d 422,426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied); Bethel v.
Norman Furniture Co., 756 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, no writ).
10. 775 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1989, writ denied).
11. 767 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1989).
12. Id. at 694.
13. Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 359 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied), cerL
denied 110 S.Ct. 722 (1990).
14. Bethel, 756 S.W.2d at 9.
15. Bloom v. Bloom, 767 S.W.2d 463, 471-72 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ
denied).
16. Fisher v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 760 S.W.2d 802, 806 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988,
no writ).
17. U.S. v. Rainbow Family, 695 F.Supp. 314, 330 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (referring to Field
Hygiene and Sanitation, Army Training Circular, and Field Sanitation Team Training).
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notice the law of other states.18 A party who requests judicial notice of the
law of another state must furnish the court with sufficient information to
enable the court to comply with the request. 19 Where the wife in a divorce
action requested the trial court to take judicial notice of the common law,
public statutes and court decisions of the state of New Mexico, the San
Antonio appeals court held that this broad, general request failed to apprise
the trial court of the particular laws relied upon and to provide sufficient
information to enable the court properly to comply with the request.20 In
the absence of proof of the law of a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign jurisdic-
tion's law is presumed to be the same as Texas law. 21 Where neither party
offered proof of Pennsylvania law or requested the trial court to take judicial
notice of the law of Pennsylvania at a hearing in a child custody and support
case, the state where the parties had been divorced, the Corpus Christi ap-
peals court presumed Pennsylvania law to be the same as Texas law in the
absence of proof to the contrary.22
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court considered Texas
Rule of Civil Evidence 202 in Daugherty v. Southern Pacific Transportation
Company.23 The issue in Daugherty concerned whether the trial court erred
in failing to take judicial notice of OSHA regulations because the
Daughertys had not pleaded the regulations in question.24 The Texas
Supreme Court agreed with the Daughertys that a party does not need to
plead a statute or regulation of another jurisdiction before a court can take
judicial notice.2S The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, however, with the
Daughertys' contention that courts automatically take judicial notice of fed-
eral law, explaining that Rule 202 requires the moving party to furnish suffi-
cient information to the trial court for it to determine the foreign law's
applicability and to furnish all parties notice.26 Since the Daughertys at-
tempted to establish that the OSHA regulations applied, and had presented
and explained the regulations to the jury several times during the trial, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court should have admitted the
OSHA regulations under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 202.27 The supreme
court disagreed with the court of appeals' unpublished opinion that refusal
to take judicial notice of the OSHA regulations was harmless error.28
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 204 permits a court to take judicial notice of
Texas city and county ordinances, the contents of the Texas Register, and
18. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 202.
19. Id.
20. Knops v. Knops, 763 S.W.2d 864, 867 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
21. Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. 1963); Ewing v. Ewing, 739 S.W.2d
470, 472 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
22. Creavin v. Moloney, 773 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ
denied).
23. 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (rex. 1989).
24. Id. at 82.
25. Id. at 83.
26. Ili, citing Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 202.




the rules of agencies published in the Administrative Code.29 In an action
against a city to recover for the death of a bicyclist who was killed when he
turned his bicycle to avoid running into a hole on the road's shoulder and
was struck by a tractor trailer rig, the court of appeals, without mentioning
rule 204, took notice of a city ordinance.30 The ordinance approved a main-
tenance agreement executed by the city and the state that set forth responsi-
bility of each for maintaining roads and shoulders. 31
III. BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses presumptions. Be-
cause the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence lack a corresponding article III,
Texas common law continues to govern the law of presumptions. The fol-
lowing recent cases have further developed the law of presumptions and bur-
den of proof.
The court in John Deere Co. v. May 32 held that a party's failure to pro-
duce evidence within its control or failure to call its own officers, employees
or field representative raised a presumption or inference that such evidence
and testimony, if produced, would have been unfavorable on the findings
challenged on appeal.33 The Waco court of appeals, therefore, held that the
negligent and proximate cause findings challenged on appeal were supported
by legally sufficient evidence, especially the inferences arising from the fail-
ure to produce evidence and call witnesses within the defendant's control. 34
In Southwestern Life Insurance Co. v. Green 35 a widow sued to recover
benefits allegedly due to her as beneficiary under her deceased husband's life
insurance policy. The insurer testified that the insurance company never
received the widow's demand letter. The widow failed to testify that she
correctly addressed the envelope, placed the letter inside, placed a stamp on
the envelope and then put the letter in a mail deposit facility. After the
insurer's testimony of nonreceipt of the letter, the widow was never recalled
as a witness to prove up the mailing. Accordingly, the El Paso court of
appeals held that no presumption existed that the letter had been sent to the
insurance company. 36
During the Survey period, the Texarkana court of appeals held that the
presumptions ordinarily made in support of proper service do not apply
when a direct attack is made on a default judgment.37 The court explained
that the record in such a case must show strict compliance with the rules of
29. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 204.
30. Martinez v. City of San Antonio, 768 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, no writ).
31. Id.
32. 773 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ denied).
33. Id. at 377.
34. Id.
35. 768 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
36. Id. at 448.




civil procedure respecting service of process.38
IV. ARTICLE IV-RELEANCY AND ITS LiMrrs
Article IV of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs relevancy and its
limits. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
constitution, statute, or other rules.39 Evidence that is not relevant is not
admissible.4° In a personal injury action, a trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in refusing to admit evidence that the sales of plaintiff's restaurant
supply company declined after her automobile accident, where the plaintiff
failed to establish a correlation between the decline in sales and the foot
injury she suffered in the automobile accident.41 Such a correlation was nec-
essary to prove the relevancy of the declining sales figures.
A nursery owner's testimony concerning the value of trees cut down by an
electric cooperative on the landowner's property was relevant in a land-
owner's suit to recover the intrinsic value of the trees in Lamar County Elec-
tric Cooperative Association v. Bryant.42 Although the cooperative contended
that the nursery owner's testimony was irrelevant, the evidence was offered
in response to the testimony of a cooperative witness that the trees were
worthless and could not have any intrinsic value. The court of appeals rea-
soned that under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make
the existence of any material fact more or less probable than it would have
been without the evidence.43 Thus, the court held the nursery owner's testi-
mony constituted both relevant and admissible evidence.44
In a case involving constructive fraud in the formation of a corporation,
evidence that the sole shareholder of a corporation had used funds from one
of his corporations to pay personal family medical expenses was admissible
where the shareholder had opened the door for such testimony by claiming
that he did not commingle funds from his various corporations.45 The
Houston court of appeals explained that any error in the admission of the
evidence was not reversible because it was invited.46
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence
on special grounds such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or if the
evidence is merely cumulative.47 The exclusion under Rule 403 is discre-
tionary.48 During the Survey period, the Dallas court of appeals held that a
photograph of the deceased's face, though unpleasant to view, was not so
38. Id
39. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 402. For the definition of relevance, see Id 401.
40. Id 402.
41. Russell v. Hankerson, 771 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ
denied).
42. 770 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
43. Id
44. Id
45. Klein v. Sporting Goods Inc., 772 S.W.2d 173, 179 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1989, writ denied).
46. Id at 179.
47. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 403.
48. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if... ." Id (emphasis added).
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gruesome as to shock the jury or cause unfair prejudice in a wrongful death
action.49 The Corpus Christi court of appeals held that the probative value
of evidence that a workers' compensation claimant was terminated because
he had previously threatened a coemployee with a shotgun, rather than be-
cause of his work-related injury, outweighed any prejudicial effect 50
In an action by a national accounting firm to recover reimbursement fees,
merger acquisition costs and other damages allegedly resulting from a
breach of a partnership agreement, a trial court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding from evidence approximately two hundred (200) letters from
the accounting firm's clients authorizing the firm to release files to the newly
formed company.51 The San Antonio court of appeals explained that letters
could create a side issue that would unduly distract a jury from the real
issue, and that the letters were cumulative of testimony admitted at trial.52
Interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the Fifth Circuit held that evi-
dence concerning the efforts of a staff anesthesiologist to persuade a hospital
to adopt twenty-four hour anesthesia services, was relevant to claims of neg-
ligence by the hospital in not providing such twenty-four hour service.5 3
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the evidence could not be excluded on the
ground that it would have unduly distracted and confused the jury where
plaintiffs alleged that the failure to provide the twenty-four hour anesthesia
services caused their daughter to be deprived of oxygen and suffer brain
damage after the mother suffered a ruptured uterus.54
With few exceptions, character is not admissible to prove conduct on a
particular occasion.55 The Texas Supreme Court recently considered Rule
404(a) in State Bar of Texas v. Evans.56 Evans involved an attorney discipli-
nary proceeding where an attorney, accused of conduct involving moral tur-
pitude, offered the testimony of his secretary and his bookkeeper that he was
honest and that neither witness knew of anything the attorney had done to
be unfair or to cheat the complainant or other clients. The issue on appeal
concerned whether testimony elicited on cross-examination that the attorney
customarily charged more hours for work than he had actually performed
was admissible as rebuttal of character testimony.5 7 The court of appeals
rejected the State Bar's argument that Evans had opened the door to the
rebuttal character testimony it offered.58 The court of appeals concluded
that the testimony concerning Evans' overbilling of clients was not admissi-
49. Edwards Transfer Co. v. Brown, 764 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no
writ).
50. Gonzalez v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 772 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1989, no writ).
51. Peat Marwick Main v. Haass, 775 S.W.2d 698, 705-06 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, no writ).
52. Id. at 705.
53. Herrington v. Hiller, 883 F.2d 411, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1989).
54. Id.
55. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 404.
56. 774 S.W.2d 656, 657-58 (Tex. 1989) (reversing 768 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1989)).
57. Id. at 657.
58. 768 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. App.-El Paso), rev'd, 774 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1989).
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ble as rebuttal character testimony under Rule 404(a)(1).5 9 The rule permits
evidence of a pertinent character trait when offered by a person accused of
conduct involving moral turpitude, or when offered by the accusing party to
rebut the same.60 Although the court of appeals concluded that Rule
404(a)(1) did not apply, the Texas Supreme Court disagreed.61 Explaining
that the rule under which Evans was charged made him a party accused of
conduct involving moral turpitude, the supreme court held that he was al-
lowed to offer evidence of a pertinent trait of his character, and once he did,
the State Bar was then allowed to offer rebuttal testimony under Rule
404(a)(1).62
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 404(b) excludes evidence of other wrongs or
acts to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith.63 During the Survey period, the Texarkana court of
appeals excluded evidence of a prior fire at the insureds' rental property in
another city where no wrongdoing by the insureds regarding that fire was
established. 64 Evidence of a defendant's extraneous extramarital affairs was
inadmissible in an alienation of affection action, and its admission held to be
reversible error, where the evidence had no probative value and could only
serve to inflame the jury's minds and cause them to decide the case on an
improper basis. 65
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 404(b) does permit evidence of other wrongs
or acts for purposes other than proving the character of a person to show
that he acted in conformity therewith.66 For example other acts evidence
was admitted to show willfull intent in support of exemplary damages in an
action by limited partners against a general partner for breach of fiduciary
duty.67
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 408 excludes evidence of compromise and
offers to compromise when offered to prove liability or the invalidity of a
claim or its amount.68 During the Survey period, the Corpus Christi court
of appeals held that evidence of a settlement agreement between medical
malpractice plaintiffs and a hospital should not have been admitted in the
malpractice action against the physicians.69 The court found that the agree-
ment did not constitute a "Mary Carter" agreement. Additionally, the court
held the attorneys' voir dire references to the non-party hospital did not in-
59. Id. at 658.
60. Id
61. 774 S.W.2d at 658.
62. Id
63. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 404(b).
64. First S.W. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. MacDowell, 769 S.W.2d 954, 957 (rex. App.-Texar-
kana 1989, writ denied).
65. Turner v. PV Int'l Corp., 765 S.W.2d 455, 471-72 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ
denied).
66. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 404(b).
67. Johnson v. J. Hiram Moore, Ltd., 763 S.W.2d 496, 500-01 (rex. App.-Austin 1988,
writ denied).
68. Tex. IL Civ. Evid. 408.




vite or open the door to introduction of evidence concerning the existence of
the agreement. 70
In another decision the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that charts
tracking assignments of oil lease interests were inadmissible in an oil consult-
ant's breach of contract action,71 because the charts were prepared during
settlement negotiations and were offered solely for the purpose of proving a
defendant's liability. In Shafer v. Bedard72 a wife sought discovery of finan-
cial records of partnerships and corporations in which her husband owned
an interest in a divorce proceeding. The issue concerned whether the wife's
statements in a discovery hearing that certain disputed documents required a
protective order were offers to compromise.73 The court of appeals held that
had they been offers to compromise, the wife would have had the right to
object to the introduction of evidence of these offers at trial under Rule
408. 74 Because the wife did not object, and in fact presented the offers of
compromise to the court herself, the court of appeals held that the wife
waived any complaint regarding introduction of the disputed evidence. 75
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 410 excludes evidence of pleas, plea discus-
sions and related statements. 76 The rule specifically excludes pleas of nolo
contendere.77 In Turton v. State Bar of Texas 78 an attorney whose license
had been suspended complained on appeal that the trial court admitted a
criminal case order reflecting that the attorney had pled nolo contendere. In
holding the plea admissible, the San Antonio court of appeals explained that
the disciplinary action was based entirely upon the criminal case order in
which the nolo contendere plea was contained.79 The court also reasoned
that suspension is mandatory when probation is given an attorney-defendant
as a result of his commission of a serious crime irrespective of whether evi-
dence of a plea of nolo contendere existed, and that to sustain the attorney's
objection under Rule 410 would vitiate the mandatory suspension provisions
of the State Bar Act and Rules.80 Accordingly, the court held that Rule 410
did not require exclusion of the order in the disciplinary action against the
attorney.8'
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 411 provides that evidence of liability insur-
ance is not admissible regarding the issue of the insured's negligence or other
wrongful acts.82 In United Cab Company v. Mason 8 3 the Houston court of
appeals held that questions about whether plaintiffs' physician was ever re-
70. Id.
71. Hauglum v. Durst, 769 S.W.2d 646, 654 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
72. 761 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
73. Id. at 130.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 410.
77. Id 410(2).
78. 775 S.W.2d 712 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
79. Id. at 715.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 411.
83. 775 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
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quested to do an independent medical examination for an insurance com-
pany and whether the physician charged a fee to the insurance company was
not reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did not cause, improper
judgment.84 The court of appeals explained that injection of insurance into
trial is not reversible error per se and that under the facts of this case no
reversal was required. 85
V. ARTICLE V-PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs privileges. No
person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter,86 unless rules of evi-
dence recognize the privilege,87 or a statute8 or constitution8 9 grants the
privilege. Some of the specific privileges provided for in the Texas Rules of
Civil Evidence include: (1) lawyer-client privilege;90 (2) husband-wife com-
munication privilege;91 (3) communications to clergymen;92 (4) trade
secrets;93 and (5) physician-patient privilege. 94
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503 codifies the common law lawyer-client
privilege.95 Not all statements made by a client to an attorney are privi-
leged.96 The courts have construed the lawyer-client privilege narrowly be-
cause it tends to prevent full disclosure of the truth.97 Before a
communication to an attorney will be privileged, the party must show that
the communication was confidential and was made for the purpose of facili-
tating the rendition of professional legal services to the client.98 The com-
munication may be made between the client and his lawyer or a client's
representative and the lawyer.99
In Texas Dep't of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Davis 1o the
state did not show that employees of a state school who conducted an inves-
tigation of the drowning of a retarded resident of the school were client rep-
resentatives for purposes of the lawyer-client privilege. The Austin court of
84. Id. at 786.
85. Id
86. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 501(2).
87. See id. 502-510.
88. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5561h, repealed by Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 509-510 as to
civil cases and Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 509-10 as to criminal cases (confidential communications
between physician and patient relating to professional services rendered by a physician
privileged).
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.





95. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 503.
96. Hayes v. Pennock, 192 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1945, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
97. See Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co., 663 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App-
Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (deposition testimony of debtor's former attorney did not
contain privileged communications and was thus admissible).
98. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 503(b).
99. Id. 503(b)(1).
100. 775 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
1990]
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appeals, therefore, refused to issue a mandamus against the judge who held
that the documents at issue were not protected by the lawyer-client privi-
lege.1° 1 Another court held the lawyer-client privilege did not protect wit-
ness statements taken by an attorney during his investigation of the insured's
potential exposure for gross negligence and punitive damages claims, where
no lawsuit was pending and where the attorney, whose only contractual obli-
gation was with the workers' compensation carrier, had no real contact with
the insured concerning the conduct of the investigation.102
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503(b)(3) codifies the common defense privi-
lege.103 Rule 503(b)(3) privileges confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client
when such communications are made by the client "or his representative or
his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer, or a representative
of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a
matter of common interest therein ... ." ,04 In Ryals v. Canales05 an action
for damages arising from an automobile accident, an individual defendant
successfully asserted a claim that the joint defense privilege protected his
communications with the codefendant automobile manufacturer from dis-
covery. The Dallas court of appeals explained that the manufacturer was, at
least in theory, aligned with the individual defendant as a party before the
court from the time it ified the plea of intervention. 10 6
VI. ARTICLE VI-WITNESSES
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 601 governs the competency and incompe-
tency of witnesses.107 Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence.108 This rule specif-
ically holds insane persons and children who appear not to possess sufficient
intellect to relate transactions with respect to which they are interrogated to
be incompetent witnesses. 19 In Handel v. Long Trusts 10 the Texarkana
court of appeals considered whether the settlor of a gas exploration trust,
who was 80 years old and had severe deficits in recent memory, was capable
of making intelligent observations at the time of the events giving rise to the
suit. Concluding that the witness could recall and narrate such events at the
time of trial, and was capable of understanding the obligation of the oath,
the Texarkana court of appeals held the settlor competent to testify."'
101. Id at 473.
102. Sterling Drilling Co. v. Spector, 761 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no
writ).
103. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 503(b)(3).
104. Id.
105. 767 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
106. Id at 228-29.
107. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 601.
108. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 602 provides that a witness may not testify to a matter unless it is
shown that he has personal knowledge of the matter.
109. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 601(a)(1)(2).
110. 757 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
111. Id at 851.
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Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 602 provides that a witness may not testify
to a matter unless he has personal knowledge of the matter.1 12 For example,
in Handel v. Long Trusts, an employee's deposition testimony as to the oc-
currence at issue was inadmissible because the employee lacked personal
knowledge, and the deposition testimony failed to establish the employee as
an expert, whose opinions would have been admissible under Texas Rule of
Evidence 703 as an exception to Rule 602.113
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 606(b) governs jury misconduct.'1 4 Upon
inquiry into a verdict's validity, a juror may testify regarding only "whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror."'"I5 A
juror's affidavit asserting that the jury had discussed newspaper articles, sim-
ilarly situated injured persons, and insurance coverage, and that a juror had
failed to properly answer voir dire questions, was held not to show outside
influence, and thus, could not be considered to show jury misconduct. 116
Another court held jurors' discussions of attorney's fees also could not be
considered outside influence requiring a new trial. 117
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 607 permits a party to impeach his own
witness." 8 Accordingly, where a party claimed on appeal that his opponent
had impeached his own witness, the court of appeals held that the party who
sponsored the witness was not bound by his testimony and could impeach
that witness under Rule 607.119
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 611 governs the mode and order of interro-
gation and presentation.120 Rule 611 gives the court reasonable control over
the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting the evi-
dence. 121 During the Survey period, the San Antonio Court of Appeals con-
sidered the breadth of the trial court's discretion under Rule 611 in Prezelski
v. Christiansen, 122 a medical malpractice suit against a physician. The court
addressed the issue of whether the trial court's permitting defendant to call
his expert witness out of order before plaintiff had an opportunity to cross-
examine the defendant resulted in a materially unfair trial under the circum-
stances. 12 In holding that this order of presentation had resulted in a mate-
rially unfair trial to the plaintiffs, the court of appeals explained that Rule
611, which gives the trial court reasonable control over the order of wit-
nesses, did not give the trial court unbridled discretion to impose unreasona-
112. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 602.
113. 757 S.W.2d 848, 850-51 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
114. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 606(b).
115. Id,
116. King v. Bauer, 767 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
117. Kirby Forest Indus. v. Kirkland, 772 S.W.2d 226, 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
118. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 607.
119. Loyd Electric Co., v. Millett, 767 S.W.2d 476,479 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no
writ).
120. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 611(a).
121. Id
122. 775 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989) rev'd on other grounds, 782 S.W.2d
842 (Tex. 1990).
123. Id at 766-67.
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ble control when the result prevented the plaintiff from exercising her right
to present her case fairly.124
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 612 governs writings used to refresh the
memory of a witness.' 25 Rule 612 permits production of such a writing
when it has been used to refresh the memory of a witness. 126 Where the
record failed to reflect that the statement at issue had been used to refresh
the witness's memory, one court of appeals held that nothing was presented
for appellate review.' 27
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 613 governs prior consistent and inconsis-
tent statements of a witness. 128 The El Paso appeals court held that a prior
inconsistent statement which was admitted for impeachment, could only be
considered for purposes of impeachment and not as substantive evidence of
the truth of the matter stated. 129 Another court admitted a prior consistent
statement over objection explaining that such facts as that the document had
been prepared several years after the transaction at issue and following
changes in insurance regulations, went to the weight and not admissibility of
the evidence. 130
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 614, commonly referred to as the rule, pro-
vides for the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom so they cannot hear
and be influenced by the testimony of other witnesses.' 31 Three classes of
witnesses are exempt from the operation of the rule, including any person
whose presence is essential to the presentation of a party's cause. 132 During
the Survey period, one court held that a party's expert witness was entitled
to be present during the trial, and implied that it was applying Texas Rule of
Civil Evidence 614(3). 133
VII. ARTICLE VII-OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses
The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence permit lay witnesses to offer rationally
based opinions to help clarify facts or misunderstandings. 134 The rules have
greatly liberalized the admission of lay witnesses' opinion testimony. 135
Texas evidence law has always been liberal in allowing an owner of property
to offer his opinion of the property's value. 136 A property owner can give
124. Id
125. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 612.
126. Id
127. City of San Antonio v. Vela, 762 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988,
writ denied).
128. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 613.
129. Pope v. Stephenson, 774 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
130. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 772 S.W.2d 242, 249 (rex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no writ).
131. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 614.
132. Id. 614(3).
133. Elbar, Inc. v. Claussen, 774 S.W.2d 45, 52 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1989, no writ).
134. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 701.
135. Id
136. See Classified Parking Sys. v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
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opinion testimony even though he would not be qualified as an expert re-
garding the value of the same property if another person owned the
property.1 37
During the Survey period one Texas court admitted the testimony of the
employee of a lessor-assignor of equipment leases. 138 The employee testified
that he would not have transferred the equipment lease knowing the lessee
was bankrupt. In admitting the testimony, the Dallas Court of Appeals ex-
plained that the testimony was rationally based upon the witness' perception
and was helpful in the determination of a fact in issue, even though the wit-
ness was not an expert and as such would not ordinarily be permitted to
express opinions or to speculate. 139
In the absence of direct testimony of a testator's lack of capacity on the
day of execution of a will, the testator's mental condition on the day of exe-
cution may be determined from lay opinion testimony based upon witnesses'
observations of the testator's conduct either prior or subsequent to the exe-
cution.1 40 The Houston court of appeals during the Survey period admitted
such testimony in Jones v. LaFargue.1 41 The court explained that lay testi-
mony of the testator's incompetency at times other than as the executor of
the will can be used to establish incompetency on the day of execution if it is
demonstrated that the condition had some probability of being the condition
of the testator at the time the will was executed.142
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is identical to Texas Rule of Civil Evidence
701.143 During the Survey Period, the Fifth Circuit upheld the admission of
a coworker's lay opinion that a former employee was discharged and not
rehired because of his age in Hansard v. Pepsi Cola Metropolitan Bottling
Company.144 The Fifth Circuit explained that such lay testimony was ad-
missible in an age discrimination action, although the coworker may not
have had any firsthand knowledge of the events surrounding the former em-
ployee's termination.1 45 The Fifth Circuit further explained that the deter-
mination of whether testimony meets the criteria of Federal Rule of
Evidence 701 remains in the discretion of the trial court.14
For a property owner to qualify as a witness on damages to property, the
owner's testimony must reflect that the owner's statements refer to the mar-
ket, rather than the intrinsic value of the property.1 47 Where a lay witness
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (owner of car stolen from parking garage competent to testify as to
car's value).
137. Id.
138. Chase Commercial Corp. v. Datapoint Corp., 774 S.W.2d 359, 368 (rex. App.-Dal-
las 1989, no writ).
139. Id.
140. Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609, 611 (rex. 1968).
141. 758 S.W.2d 320, 325 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
142. Id
143. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 701; Fed. R. Evid. 702.
144. 865 F.2d 1461, 1466-67 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 110 S.Ct. 129, 107 L.Ed.2d 89
(1990).
145. ld
146. Id. at 1467.
147. Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1984).
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
expressed an opinion not on market value but rather on an unaccepted offer
to purchase property, his lay testimony as to value was held to be no evi-
dence of value of the property for purpose of calculating damages. 148 In a
premises liability action, another court excluded testimony of the premises
owner regarding the injured parties' measure of damages. 149 The Corpus
Christi appeals court reasoned that the owner's opinion was not reasonably
or rationally based upon her perception concerning the amount of money
necessary to fairly and adequately compensate the injured parties, her opin-
ion was speculative, and her opinion appeared to be at least partially based
on physical pain and suffering allegations experienced by the injured par-
ties.1 ° In a DTPA action by the owner of a hairstyling salon against the
contractor for failing to perform the contract to remodel the building, an
owner was entitled to give her opinion of the amount of the salon's lost
profits, where her opinion was based upon personal knowledge of financial
data of a similar salon she had previously owned and operated in the same
shopping center. 51
B. Testimony by Experts
1. Competency of. Expert
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 702 permits expert opinion testimony from a
witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education."' 152 Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 104(a) provides that prelimi-
nary questions regarding qualification of a witness shall be determined by
the court. 53 During the Survey period, an experienced surgeon who had
written articles about seat belt-type. injuries was held qualified to give expert
opinion testimony as to whether a child would have sustained abdominal
injuries if a seat belt had been resting on the child's pelvic bone rather than
on the soft abdominal tissue.' 5 4 The court explained that the surgeon's testi-
mony should not have been excluded merely because he was not a bi-
omechanical engineer.' 55 Another court admitted the opinion of an
independent marine surveyor as to a shrimp boat's fair market value, even
though the surveyor had never seen the shrimp boat at issue, where his testi-
mony was based on hypothetical questions and photographs.' 5 6 A police
officer, however, by his position alone, was held not qualified to render an
148. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wilson, 768 S.W.2d 755, 762 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1988, writ denied).
149. Clark v. McFerrin, 760 S.W.2d 822, 827-28 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ
denied).
150. Id.
151. Peni v. Ludwig, 766 S.W.2d 298, 303-04 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, no writ).
152. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 702.
153. Id. 104(a).
154. Guentzel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 768 S.W.2d 890, 897 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, writ denied).
155. Id.
156. SPT Fed. Credit Union v. Big H Auto Auction, Inc., 761 S.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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expert opinion regarding the causes of an accident. 157
2. Subject of Expert Testimony
During the Survey period, one court admitted the testimony of a professor
of hotel and restaurant management on the characteristics of a nightclub to
explain the meaning of the term nightclub as used in a lease that prohibited
the operation of a restaurant as a nightclub." 8 In a suit by homeowners to
recover the proceeds allegedly due under a fire policy, expert testimony con-
cerning the different motives for setting fires and methods in which the ex-
pert could discern the motives was admissible in Lundy v. Allstate Insurance
Co. 159 The expert, however, was not allowed to testify as to his opinion
regarding the plaintiffs. 16° He also could not testify about how the motives
could be ascertained in the actual litigation in which he was testifying.161
3. Testimony of Medical Experts
In a medical malpractice case a plastic surgeon was held qualified to ex-
press expert medical opinions regarding the care for an injured leg rendered
by the emergency room physician and by the family physician.' 62 The sur-
geon had been a medical doctor practicing in his specialty, which was the
same as the defendant doctor's, for thirty-five years.
C. Bases of Opinion Testimony
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 703 outlines the proper bases of expert opin-
ion testimony.1 63 If experts in the same field as the witness would reason-
ably rely on certain data, the data can form the bases of the expert's opinion
and need not be admissible in evidence.164 If the bases of an expert's opinion
are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 165 In Seaside Industries v.
Cooper,166 the court held that an expert's opinion as to the net worth of a
judgment debtor company was admissible in an action against the debtor's
president to recover for constructive fraud.'67 The court explained that as-
suming, arguendo, that the business records on which the expert's opinion
was based were inadmissible hearsay, nevertheless, Rule 703 provides that
157. Pyle v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 774 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1989, writ denied). Because the police officer's testimony was held to be cumulative, the
Court of Appeals held that it was not reversibly harmful. Id at 695-96.
158. Hellenic Inv. Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 865-66 (Tex. App.-Houston (ist
Dist.] 1989, no writ).
159. 774 S.W.2d 352, 357-58 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
160. Id at 357.
161. Id
162. Poindexter v. Foster, 772 S.W.2d 205, 207-08 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ
denied).
163. Tex. I. Civ. Evid. 703.
164. Id
165. Id
166. 766 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
167. Id at 571.
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an expert's opinion need not be based upon admissible evidence. 168
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 703 is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence
703.169 During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the admission
of the testimony of a toxicologist who had relied on certain studies in form-
ing his opinion. 170 Rejecting the appellant's challenge that the expert's the-
ory of causation was specious, the Fifth Circuit explained that an expert's
opinion need not be generally accepted in the scientific community to be
reliable and probative enough to support a jury finding. 171
D. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 705 governs the disclosure of facts or data
underlying expert opinion.' 7 2 An expert may give his opinion without prior
disclosure of the underlying facts or data. 173 In Liquid Energy Corp. v.
Trans-Pan Gathering, Inc. 174 a party who was qualified as an expert witness
on petroleum engineering was allowed to give expert opinion on lost profits
without disclosing underlying data.175 In affirming the admission of the tes-
timony, the Amarillo court of appeals explained the opponent of the evi-
dence was entitled to disclosure of the supporting data upon which the
expert witness' testimony was based on cross-examination, but that lack of
data to support the expert witness' testimony affects the weight of the testi-
mony and not its admissibility.17 6
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 705 provides that the expert may disclose on
direct examination the facts or data underlying his opinion. '77 The issue in
First Southwest Lloyds Insurance Company v. MacDowell,17 8 concerned
whether an expert was entitled to state in detail all the information that
contributed to the formation of his opinion.' 79 In affirming the exclusion of
an eyewitness' statement to the fire marshal, even though it formed a part of
the basis of the fire marshal's opinion that the fire was incendiary, the Texar-
kana court of appeals explained that the use of the permissive word "may"
in Rule 705 indicates that the expert does not have an absolute right to dis-
close the facts and data underlying his opinions.' 80 The court explained that
the better position is to not allow affirmative admission of otherwise inad-
missible matters that happen to underly the data upon which the expert
168. Id
169. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 703; Fed. R. Evid. 703.
170. Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1433 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 110
S.Ct. 328 107 L.Ed.2d 318 (1990).
171. Id
172. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 705.
173. Id
174. 758 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Amarillo), vacated, 762 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1988, no writ).
175. Id at 637-39.
176. Id.
177. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 705.
178. 769 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).





E. Effect of Opinion Testimony
Triers of fact are not required to accept the opinion of experts on either
side of a controversy. 182 The Corpus Christi court of appeals held that a
trial court acted within its discretion as a fact finder in accepting the expert
testimony that an airplane engine was subjected to excessive metal stress,
despite contrary testimony. 183
VIII. ARTICLE VII-HEARSAY
A. Identifying Hearsay
Whether a record or statement offered to prove the truth of a matter con-
stitutes hearsay is often difficult to determine.184 Specifically, hearsay is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.185
Several courts during the Survey period considered whether proferred evi-
dence was hearsay. In Durbin v. Hardin,186 a police officer's testimony as to
what a Spanish-speaking declarant said to him through an interpreter was
inadmissible hearsay. That words were uttered is sometimes the very fact
sought to be established. Such testimony is admissible because the mere ut-
terance of the words has legal significance, and may constitute part of the
cause of action or defense, and as such are operative facts, as occurred in
Williams v. Jennings.187
B. Statements That Are Not Hearsay
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e) excludes from the definition of hear-
say prior statements by a witness,1 38 admissions by a party opponent, 189 and
depositions. 190
1. Admissions by Party Opponents
a Judicial Admissions
A judicially admitted fact does not require supporting evidence and the
181. Id
182. InterFirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1987, no writ).
183. Chemical Express Carriers, Inc. v. French, 759 S.W.2d 683, 690 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1988, writ denied).
184. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 801-806 comprehensively define the Hearsay Rule and its excep-
tions. Additionally, "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." IM 602.
185. I 801(d). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by law." Id. 802.
186. 775 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
187. 755 S.W.2d 874, 885 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).





judicial admission establishes the fact as a matter of law, thereby precluding
the fact finder from making any contrary findings.191 A judicial admission is
actually a substitute for evidence. 192 The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence,
while not specifically distinguishing judicial admissions from other admis-
sions, treats judicial admissions, not as exceptions to the hearsay rule, but
rather as statements that are not hearsay. 193 One court during the Survey
period held that once made or deemed by the court, judicial admissions may
not be contradicted by any evidence, whether in the form of live testimony
or summary judgment affidavits. 194
Several courts considered judicial admissions during the Survey period.
In City of Austin v. Miller 195 the Austin court of appeals held that although
testimonial declarations by a party do not ordinarily constitute judicial ad-
missions, they did in Miller, because the testimonial declarations were well
within the witness' competence, his peculiar experience, knowledge, training,
and official responsibilities. 196 A statement by a crane repair company that
repairs were completed in or about July was not inconsistent with the finding
that repairs were completed on June 20, and therefore did not constitute a
judicial admission because it was not contradictory of a prior statement.197
Nor did a lawyer's remarks to the court, which dispensed with the require-
ment for submission of an issue to the jury regarding the amount of actual
tort damages before exemplary damages could be awarded for alleged tor-
tious interference, constitute either a judicial admission or a stipulation. 198
b. Vicarious Admissions
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e)(2)(D) provides that admissions of
agents or employees are admissible if they concern matters within the scope
of employment and are made during the employment period.1 99 Where a
party failed to establish that the proffered deposition testimony of an em-
ployee concerned a matter within the scope of the employee's employment,
the testimony was held not admissible as an admission of a party oppo-
nent.2°° Like Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e)(2), Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(d)(2) governs party admissions.20' During the Survey period, one
191. IA R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence Civil and Criminal § 1127 (Texas Practice 3rd ed.
1980).
192. Id.
193. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 801(e)(2).
194. Crowley v. Coles, 760 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no
writ); see also Collision Center Paint & Body, Inc. v. Campbell, 773 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex.
App-Dallas 1989, no writ)(lienholder waived right to rely on deemed admissions as conclu-
sive proof by failing to object to admission of controverting evidence).
195. 767 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
196. Id. at 287.
197. Cranetex, Inc. v. Precision Crane & Rigging, 760 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex. App.-Tex-
arkana 1988, writ denied).
198. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. American Nat'l Petroleum Co., 763 S.W.2d
809, 820-21 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ granted).
199. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 801(e)(2)(D).
200. Handel v. Long Trusts, 757 S.W.2d 848, 851 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
201. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 801(e)(2).
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federal court held that statements attributed to the defendant or his employ-
ees in the plaintiff's summary judgment affidavits were not hearsay because
they were admissions of a party opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2). 202
C. The Hearsay Rule
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 802 provides that "[i]nadmissible hearsay
admitted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely be-
cause it is hearsay." 20 3 Citing Rule 802, the San Antonio court of appeals
held that a psychiatrist's opinion, supported by his review of medical records
in an interview with a patient, was sufficient to support the renewal of an
involuntary commitment, even though the psychiatrist had no personal
knowledge of recent overt dangerous acts or continuing pattern of behavior
tending to confirm the likelihood of serious harm.2°4
D. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial
1. Excited Utterances
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(2) admits excited utterances into evi-
dence as an exception to the hearsay rule.205 During the Survey period, the
Dallas court of appeals held that an excited utterance may describe an inci-
dent remote in time from the startling event, as long as the statement is
made while the declarant is still in a state of excitement.20 6 Because a state-
ment that is simply a narrative of past acts or events does not qualify as an
excited utterance regardless of how soon after the event it is made, an eye-
witness's statement to a fire marshal was not admissible as an excited utter-
ance because it constituted a narrative account given after the eye witness
had returned to the fire scene.207
2. Business Records
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(6) governs the introduction of records of
regularly conducted activities, commonly known as business records.208
Rule 803(6) requires that the records be kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity by a person with knowledge of the recorded in-
formation and as a regular practice of the business.209 Live witness testi-
mony is not required to demonstrate the document is a business record.210
Documentary evidence, affidavits, party admissions, and other materials will
suffice.211 During the Survey period, the affidavit of the chief forensic toxi-
202. FTC v. Hughes, 710 F.Supp. 1520, 1522 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
203. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 802.
204. Lopez v. State, 775 S.W.2d 857, 859-60 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
205. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 803(2).
206. City of Dallas v. Donovan,. 768 S.W.2d 905, 908 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
207. MacDowell, 769 S.W.2d at 958-59.
208. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 803(6).
209. Id




cologist who analyzed a blood sample for alcohol concentration was suffi-
cient to self-authenticate the blood alcohol report as a business record.212
The self-authentication was allowed even though the affidavit did not state
the forensic toxicologist was custodian of the records, did not state that the
blood sample was drawn by the county medical examiner, and did not attest
to the accuracy or trustworthiness of the underlying report.213
The foundation for admitting business records is set forth in Rule 803(6),
and once the requisites of that rule are met, the document at issue will be
admitted as a business record.214 Letters written by an insured's physician
and numerous claim progress reports that were sent from his office reflecting
his diagnosis of the insured were held properly excluded where the evidence
did not reflect that the proper predicate was laid to establish the exhibits as
business records under Rule 803(6).215 Similarly, a business document was
held properly excluded in a personal injury case where no proper foundation
was laid.216 During the Survey period, one court permitted a witness with-
out personal knowledge to testify from the business records of which she was
custodian. 217
3. Statements in Ancient Documents
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803 admits into evidence as exceptions to the
hearsay rule statements in ancient documents. 218 The rule defines an ancient
document as one that is "in existence twenty (20) years or more the authen-
ticity of which is established. '219 During the Survey period, the Tyler court
of appeals held that a will that was twenty-three years old at the time of trial
and was properly authenticated was admissible under the ancient documents
exception to the hearsay rule.220
4. Learned Treatises
Within certain narrowly circumscribed circumstances articulated in Texas
Rule of Civil Evidence 803(18), statements from learned treatises may be
read into evidence as exceptions to the hearsay rule, but may not be received
as exhibits. 221 In King v. Bauer222 a medical malpractice case, a textbook on
radiotherapy, published two years after the treatment alleged to have caused
212. March v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 773 SoW.2d 785, 788-89 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth
1989, no writ).
213. Id.
214. See Seaside Indus., 766 S.W.2d at 570-71 (financial statements and tax returns admit-
ted as business records).
215. Security Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Gomez, 768 S.W.2d 505, 510-11 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1989, no writ).
216. National Bugmobiles, Inc. v. Jobi Properties, 773 S.W.2d 616, 618-20 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
217. Goff v. Southmost Say. & Loan Ass'n, 758 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, writ denied).
218. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 803(16).
219. Id.
220. Kamel v. Kamel, 760 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied).
221. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 803(18).
222. 767 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
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plaintiff's injuries, was admitted under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence
803(18).223 That the edition was not published until two years after the
treatment at issue did not disqualify the evidence.2 4
5. Catchall Hearsay Exception
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), commonly known as the catchall hear-
say exception, admits as exceptions to the hearsay rule, subject to certain
restrictions, statements not specifically covered by the other twenty-three ex-
ceptions, but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.225 The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence do not contain an equivalent
catchall exception.
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting interrogatory answers as exceptions to
the hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) in Calderon v. Pre-
sidio Valley Farmers Ass'n. 226 In Calderon an action by farmworkers against
a growers' association, the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court's reliance on
interrogatory answers was not an abuse of discretion because the farmers
had lost or destroyed almost all of the relevant wage records.227 The Fifth
Circuit further explained that the interrogatory answers were admissible
under the catchall hearsay exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24).228
E. Hearsay Within Hearsay
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 805 provides that hearsay within hearsay is
not excluded "if each part of the combined statements conforms with an
exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules." 229 Neither court of
appeals that considered statements allegedly constituting hearsay within
hearsay during the Survey period admitted these statements. In First South-
west Lloyds Insurance Co. v. McDowell23° the Texarkana court of appeals, in
excluding the report of a fire marshal, found that although the report itself
was a public record, and therefore met the hearsay exception of Rule 803(8),
that parts of the report, including an eyewitness's account to the fire mar-
shal, did not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule.231 The court ex-
plained that multiple hearsay is admissible only if each part of the combined
statements fits within an exception to the hearsay rule, citing Texas Rule of
Civil Evidence 805.232 Without citing Rule 805, the El Paso court of appeals
held that testimony that a company's attorney made certain statements as to
what another person had said about a particular contract was second layer
223. Id at 199-200.
224. Id. at 200.
225. Fed. R. Evid. 803(24).
226. 863 F.2d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 1989) cert. denied 110 S.Ct. 79 (1990).
227. Id
228. Id
229. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 805.





hearsay, and affirmed the exclusion of the statement. 233
IX. ARTICLE IX-AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 901 requires authentication or identification
of evidence as a condition precedent to admitting the offered evidence. 234
The authentication requirement is satisfied by evidence that is sufficient to
show that the matter in question is what its proponent alleges.235 Federal
Rule of Evidence 901(a) is identical to Texas Rule of Civil Evidence
901(a).23 6 During the Survey period, the district court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas held that unsworn statements in summary judgment affidavits
were sufficiently authenticated because each affiant had signed his statement
under the penalty of perjury. 237
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 901(b) illustrates authentication or identifi-
cation conforming with the requirements of Rule 901.238 "Appearance, con-
tents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken
in conjunction with circumstances" 239 are distinctive characteristics that
conform with the requirements of Rule 901. In City of Corsicana v.
Herod240 the Waco court of appeals held that an exhibit offered in a con-
demnation trial had distinctive characteristics that connected it to a design
engineer, and thus the exhibit was authenticated under Texas Rule of Civil
Evidence 901(b)(4).24 1
Both Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 902(5) and Federal Rule of Evidence
902(5) treat official publications as self-authenticating documents for which
no extrinsic evidence of authenticity is required as a condition precedent to
admissibility.242 In United States v. Rainbow Family74 3 a federal district
court treated certain portions of a Army field manual entitled Field Hygiene
and Sanitation and Army Training circular and Field Sanitation Team
Training as self-authenticating under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(5).244
Business records accompanied by a properly phrased and executed affidavit
are treated as self-authenticating, as illustrated in Rodriguez v. Ed Hicks
Imports.245
233. Mid Plains Reeves, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., 768 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1989, writ denied).
234. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 901(a).
235. Id.
236. Id; Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).
237. Hughes, 710 F.Supp. 1520, 1522 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
238. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 901(b).
239. Id 901(b)(4).
240. 768 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, no writ).
241. Id at 814-15.
242. Fed. R. Evid. 902(5); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 902(5).
243. 695 F.Supp. 314 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
244. Id at 330.
245. 767 S.W.2d 187, 191 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ). See also March, 773
S.W.2d at 788-89. (admitting blood alcohol report as a business record with an affidavit);
Rush v. Montgomery Ward, 757 S.W.2d 521, 523-24 (rex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1988,
writ denied) (admitting computer printout of account as business record with affidavits).
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X. ARTICLE X-CoNTENS OF WRITINGS RECORDINGS AND
PHOTOGRAPHS
Article X of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs the admission of
the contents of writings, recordings, and photographs.246 Texas Rule of
Civil Evidence 1003, virtually eliminated the best evidence rule.247 Rule
1003 permits the admission of a duplicate to the same extent as an original
unless a party raises a question regarding the authenticity of the original or if
it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.248 In Rodri-
guez, copies of original business records were admissible as summary judg-
ment evidence in the absence of any question as to the authenticity of the
original business records or any proof that the use of the copies would be
unfair. 249
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 1006 provides that the otherwise admissible
contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs, which cannot
be conveniently examined in court, may be presented in the form of a chart
or summary.250 Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 is identical.251 In FTC v.
Hughes252 a federal district court held a summary judgment affidavit at-
tached to summaries of voluminous documents was admissible in the ab-
sence of allegations that the summaries were inaccurate, even though the
affiant did not personally read each document.253
XI. PAROL EVIDENCE
The parol evidence rule proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret a writing in some circumstances. 254 A court may allow extrinsic evi-
dence if it finds a contract to be ambiguous. 25 5 The rule prohibits parol
evidence concerning the terms in a contract if the contract is integrated.2 56
Several courts during the Survey period excluded parol evidence to inter-
pret an unambiguous written contract.257 Although fraud is an exception to
the parol evidence rule, one court excluded evidence of fraud where the pro-
ponent of extrinsic evidence did not make the required showing of some type
246. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. art. X.
247. I 1003.
248. Id.
249. 767 S.W.2d at 191.
250. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 1006.
251. Fed. R. Evid. 1006.
252. 710 F.Supp. 1520 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
253. Id at 1523-24.
254. See 2 R. Ray, supra note 174, § 1601.
255. See Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 732 (rex. 1981) (construction of unam-
biguous oil and gas lease).
256. Integration is the practice of embodying a transaction into a final written agreement
intended to incorporated in its terms the entire transaction. See 2 R. Ray, supra note 174,
§ 1602.
257. Bayoud v. Shank, Irwin & Conant, 774 S.W.2d 22, 24 Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no
writ); Edwards v. Lone Star Gas Co., 769 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988), rev'd;
33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 148 (Jan. 3, 1990); Ferguson v. DRG/Colony North Ltd., 764 S.W.2d 874,
882 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); Candlelight Hills Civic Ass'n, v. Goodwin, 763
S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
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of trickery, artifice, or device. 258 Another court admitted parol evidence to
prove that the consideration recited in deeds or other written instruments
was not in fact paid.2 59
The Dallas court of appeals held parol evidence admissible for purposes of
applying an unambiguous contract to its subject matter, where the meaning
of the language used becomes uncertain when applied to the subject matter
of the agreement. 26 0 That court explained, however, that the rule permitting
parol evidence for purposes of applying a contract to its subject matter does
not operate to provide parties with opportunity to vary or contradict the
language used or to vary the agreement expressed in the writing.26 1 Instead
the rule merely allows the admission of extraneous evidence of existing cir-
cumstances to aid the court in applying the language used to the surround-
ing facts.2 62
258. Tripp Village Joint Venture v. MBank Lincoln Centre, 774 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
259. Evans v. Evans, 766 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
260. Security Say. Ass'n v. Clifton, 755 S.W.2d 925, 930 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no
writ).
261. Id.
262. Id
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